

THE OPPOSITION TO PERIKLES

In the critical years that followed the death of Kimon, it is clear that Thoukydides son of Melesias played an important role in opposition. It is less clear what he stood for positively, and Wade-Gery's brilliant and controversial article (*JHS* lii [1932] 205–27 = *Essays in Greek History* 239–70), for all its sensitivity to the values of the Athenian aristocracy, did not succeed in settling this issue.¹ My argument here is mainly negative, that Plutarch's description (*Per.* 11–12 and 14) of the conflict between Thoukydides and Perikles, our only detailed witness, is worthless and has seriously distorted our picture of this period and of Athenian attitudes to the empire; and that the colony at Thourioi, as Ehrenberg maintained, was meant to serve strictly Athenian interests.

I. PLUTARCH AND THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS

For Ed. Meyer (*Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* ii 86; *GdA* iv² 1.690 n. 1) it was beyond doubt that Plutarch here preserves an authentic account of the debate over the building programme. Wade-Gery assumed the same (240–3, cf. *Hesp.* xiv [1945] 224–5), and D. L. Stockton (*Hist.* viii [1959] 69), arguing against Wade-Gery, still calls this a good and possibly contemporary source.² Since the most notable characteristic of these chapters is their vehement rhetoric and the high proportion of nonsense, this position needs more defence than it has received.

(a) *The historical setting.* The end of 12.1 refers to the transfer of the League treasury from Delos, and remarks that Perikles had removed the fairest excuse for this, that it was done for fear of the barbarians and to keep it in safety. For Wade-Gery this was a reference to the Peace of Kallias (241, cf. *Hesp.* xiv 222 n. 23), which removed the need to protect the money against Persian raids;³ and he was at some pains to argue that the reference to Athens' resources *πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον* need not imply a war still in progress but could mean 'for general war purposes'. Stockton (69–70) stressed the present participles of 12.3 (*προπολεμοῦντες*, etc.) as showing that in the mind of the writer the war still continued. Busolt (349 n. 1) had done the same, and supposed that the orators of 12.1 meant only that the money was not after all safe if it could be taken for Athenian buildings, a cruder but not less convincing interpretation. But if the war was still going on, the statement in 12.3 that Athens did all the fighting while the allies contributed no horse, no ship, no hoplite, is not just the slight oversight which it seemed to Meyer (690 n. 1) but an untruth detectable even with our slender resources. Further, there is no hint that any outside event disturbed the internal moral argument; no whisper of Koroneia or the invasion of Pleistoanax disturbs concentration on this special topic.

(b) *The rise of Thoukydides.* After Kimon's death the aristocrats looked round for a leader to resist the impending monarchy of Perikles, and they lit on Thoukydides (11.1): there is no hint of the previous career which he must in fact have had. He is here described as less warlike than Kimon, a civilian who wrestled⁴ with Perikles round the *bema*; but it would be surprising if a political leader of this period had no record in the field, and at the beginning of Plato's *Laches* we duly find their sons speaking of all that Aristeides and Thoukydides 'had done in war and peace, dealing with the affairs of the allies and of this city'. Note also Plutarch's own remark at *Dem.* 13.6, that if Demosthenes' performance on the battlefield had matched his speeches, he would have ranked not with contemporary orators but higher up with Kimon and Thoukydides and

¹ See A. W. Gomme, *HCT* i 386–7; V. L. Ehrenberg, *AJP* lxxix (1948) 149–70; F. J. Frost, *Hist.* xiii (1964) 385–99: I cite these by the author's name alone. *PE&P* = *Parthenos and Parthenon*, suppl. to *G&R* x (1963).

² Busolt wavered, suspecting the influence of Theopompos (*Gr. Gesch.* iii 349 n. 1) but half prepared to allow the authenticity of the speeches (444 n. 1). Beloch does not appear to have considered the passage anywhere as a whole. R. Meiggs (*PE&P* 40–3; *The Athenian Empire* [1972]

139–40, 155) took some large strides towards scepticism but halted on the brink: we differ at the point where he says (155) that 'the central point around which the speeches are elaborated is likely to be historical'.

³ For the previous history of this view, see Busolt 349 n. 1.

⁴ On the wrestling see Wade-Gery 243–6; this is an authentic touch, but possibly due to Plutarch himself who was aware of the association (e.g. *Per.* 8.5).

Perikles. We have no detail and obviously Thoukydides' record was not comparable with Kimon's; but this last point has been exploited in a way that would not have occurred to a contemporary.

(c) *Organisation of the party.* Thoukydides (11.2) did not allow his followers to be obscured by being scattered around among the people, *χωρὶς δὲ διακρίνας καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς ταῦτό* he made them a formidable force and brought matters to a close balance. The standard interpretation of this is that it refers to seating arrangements in the assembly, the party sitting in a block in a particular area of the Pnyx.⁵ That makes some sense of the words cited above, though I doubt if it is realistic to suppose that, before Thoukydides' intervention, any man found his *ἀξίωμα* much damaged because of the neighbours with whom he sat. The manoeuvre was not impracticable and could be thought useful, for the chorus in Ar. *Eccl.* 296–8 propose that the women should sit close together and support one another; but it was not habitual either, for in 415 Nicias could expect (Thuc. vi 13.1) that one of his supporters might be seated next to a supporter of Alkibiades. Wade-Gery (243), though he accepted the seating interpretation, saw it more as a matter of organising the vote: 'the Opposition was instructed to vote, not on the merits of the case, but as it bore on the question of breaking Perikles'. That perhaps makes more sense of the beginning of the sentence—if aristocrats followed their own whim or local interest, their vote on a particular issue might be 'scattered and mixed in with the *demos*'—and it fits the doctrine of 11.3; but it is not entirely satisfactory and I doubt if it is worth while to try and extract a specific political manoeuvre from this rhetorical passage.

(d) *The People and the Few.* There had always been (11.3) a latent split between the aristocratic and demotic ideologies, but the contest of these two men made the deepest cut, causing one side to be called *demos* and the other *oligoi*. For *demos* this is patently untrue, though it might be the case that *oligoi* gained currency in these years (Hdt. iii 81.1 need not be far away in date); but for the present argument it is more important that Plutarch's own usage does not conform to the principle. Inevitably, he had used *demos* in his *Solon*, where 'the rich' is the most frequent label for the other side; in later *Lives* we find either aristocrats (as here, 11.1) or one of the cant terms familiar from *Ath. Pol.* He does not switch to *oligoi* at this or at any point, a term which he avoids in dealing with normal Athenian politics. This then is not his own determination, but one taken over from his current source, which was no doubt concerned to inflate the long-term significance of his chosen topic.

(e) *The building programme.* The use of the tribute money for Athenian buildings has at all times proved a fruitful subject for moral indignation, but it would surely have been no hard task to persuade the people of Athens that they had earned the money and were entitled to spend it on the repair of their ruined temples. If Thoukydides campaigned on the basis that this was immoral (12.1–2),⁶ it is no surprise that he lost, but it would be surprising indeed if he had come near winning. But no other source attempts to define for us the issue that was settled by the ostracism of Thoukydides, and that may account for the fact that anyone has ever believed that he stood on this high moral platform and nearly won.

But it is the fervid description of Perikles' counter-measures that does most to sap our confidence.

(i) *Festivals, etc.* At this time (11.4) Perikles loosened the reins, always contriving some new spectacle or feast or procession in the city. The notion that feasts and processions in fifth-century Athens could be turned on (and off?) by some single person in control of the tap is an odd one, and

⁵ Philochoros (*FGrH* 328 F 140) tells us that in 410 a new clause was incorporated into the bouleutic oath, that Councillors must sit *ἐν τῷ γράμματι ᾧ ἂν λάχωσιν*; and that has been brought into the argument (see Jacoby *ad loc.*). Whether or not this means allocation of seats in the Boule individually, nothing of the kind could be done on the Pnyx.

⁶ If he had really spoken of 'thousand-talent temples' (12.2), that would have been a bit immoral too: cf. R. S. Stanier, *JHS* lxxiii (1953) 68–76; A. Burford, *PCPhS* n.s. xi (1965) 25.

suggests that the author was more familiar with the part played by games etc. of special magnificence in the politics of Rome: contrast Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 3.2 (cf. 1.13), who remarked on the number of festivals celebrated by the democracy, but clearly refers to regular annual celebrations. An unusual feature here is the recognition of the cultural value of the bribes contrived by Perikles, *διαπαιδαγωγῶν οὐκ ἀμούσοις ἡδοναῖς τὴν πόλιν*: contemporary critics and their successors in the next generations could see that Perikles *ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν*, but not that the process was educative.

(ii) *Naval activity*. He also (11.4) sent out sixty triremes every year, in which many citizens served eight months with pay, *μελετῶντες ἄμα καὶ μανθάνοντες τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν*. It is not quite clear what they were supposed to be doing: ἄμα does not join the two participles, whose meaning is barely distinguishable, but must refer back to *ἐπλεον*, i.e. they learnt while they sailed for some other purpose not specified. Ps. Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.19–20, though a little muddled, is clearer about that: because of their overseas possessions and offices the Athenians unconsciously pick up the technique of rowing, steersmen gain experience on ships of various types, and all this pays off when triremes have to be manned. This passage, especially *λελήθασι μανθάνοντες*, is strong evidence against any regular system of training for the rowers of the Athenian navy. Athens could rely on an adequate pool of men experienced in the basic technique, and what mattered for the particular expedition was that the crews should learn to work together after they had been enrolled. Thus the distance to be travelled before the actual fighting could be important: Thymocharis in 411 fought with *ἀξυγκροτήτοις πληρώμασιν* (Thuc. viii 95.2) because the emergency and the short voyage to Eretria gave no time to pull the crews together,⁷ whereas Iphikrates in 372, whose training programme attracted so much praise from Xenophon (*Hell.* vi 2.27–30) had all the way to Kerkyra to work his crews up. In any case, for Plutarch the training is subsidiary to the unstated main purpose of these voyages which must presumably, as with Ps. Xen., be concerned with the administration of the empire. This no doubt increasingly required the despatch overseas of a substantial number of ships, but Plutarch's figures are absurd, as the finance shows.⁸ We need not suppose that sailors in c. 445 were paid the full drachma per day of the Peloponnesian War (see Dover in *HCT* on Thuc. vi 31.3: *contra*, W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* i 14–24, whose arguments will be discussed in the commentary to viii 45.2), or indeed at this date they might not have got more than the two obols of pre-war jurors; but even that makes a third of a talent per ship per month, or 160T per year.

(iii) *Cleruchies*. The list (11.5–6) interrupts the rhetoric with a dose of brute fact which might indicate a less excitable source. The concluding generalities, that Perikles relieved the city of an idle and potentially mischievous crowd, helped necessitous citizens, and kept the allies under guard, are in some respects more realistic than those of Isokrates (iv 107), but disquiet may be felt at the assumption that Perikles had to deal with the problem of an unemployed urban proletariat (see below).

(iv) *Emmisthos polis*. In answer to Thoukydides' charges Perikles explains (12.3–4) that Athens provides the security for which the allies pay, and therefore is entitled to use their money. After a brief bow to the glory of the buildings he concentrates on economic benefits, stimulus to crafts, paid employment for almost the whole city. The young and strong (12.5) were paid for military service,⁹ but Perikles did not want the disorganised mob to be left out, nor to consume a dole in idleness: hence the projects for employment. This strikes the same false note as 11.6 (above), suggesting that the source was familiar with some later situation in which an unemployed urban

⁷ Polyaeus' account (iii 11.7) of Chabrias' device for training Egyptian rowers (cf. Diod. xv 92.2–3) shows what is meant by the term *ἀξυγκροτήτοις*. Since this is picked out as a 'stratagem', we can be sure that such training schemes were not normal in Greece.

⁸ Meiggs (*Ath. Emp.* 427), rightly rejecting the story as it stands, is still inclined to accept 'the basic fact that

routine patrols annually cruised in the Aegean'. I would be more inclined to follow him if other details in these chapters conveyed more confidence.

⁹ In the context these should be not hoplites but the rowers of 11.4. What they get from state funds must be their pay, and *εὐπορίας* is an exaggerated description for this.

population was a real problem, as it surely was not for fifth-century Athens.¹⁰ There follows (12.6) a list of materials and crafts, many of them exotic and brought in for the colourful effect, but even the native craftsmen would not be numerous enough to make a large dent in the statistics of employment. To find something for the ordinary man the author turns to the transport of materials and men by sea and land. Heavy transport by land was indeed difficult and expensive, and it involved some occasional specialist jobs for carpenters and others, e.g. construction of special vehicles for moving very heavy blocks of stone; but A. Burford (*P&P* 32–3) was surely right to suppose that the bulk of the work was done by the ordinary wagons and oxen of ordinary farmers during their slack season.¹¹ There is nothing here to justify the disreputable rhetoric with which the passage ends, about the enrolment of every age and kind in a contractors' army. We need not doubt that the policies of Perikles were of benefit to the poorer citizens of Athens, but not through schemes like these.

There are things here that no contemporary could have written, and we need spend no time considering Stesimbrotos or Ion as the source. The style has naturally prompted thoughts of Theopompos (n. 2 above), but only 12.1–2 provide material fully congenial to him, and it is significant that Perikles is not here simply denounced as a demagogue. An echo of a kind can be found in Aristotle's theory (*Pol.* 1313b 21–5) that the buildings of the archaic tyrants were intended to keep their subjects occupied—but also poor, which spoils the analogy. My arguments above suggest that we should look to a later time when the real conditions of life in fifth-century Athens had largely been forgotten. If a student in some post-classical school had been told to compose antithetic orations on the morality of using the tribute to build the Parthenon, the conditions of his own time might have suggested to him that Perikles could be defended in terms of a full employment policy;¹² and it would have been easy for such a student to leave out of account the external events which, especially in 446, must have taken up the main part of the Athenians' attention. The assumption of a source of this type would account for the air of unreality which pervades these chapters.

If these criticisms are justified, they dispose of the only evidence that Thoukydides on moral grounds denounced the misuse of the allies' money, a proposition with little intrinsic probability. With that out of the way, there is not much to suggest that the upper classes at Athens showed tenderness to the allies. Wade-Gery (252–3) thought that the ferocious phrases attributed to Perikles in Thuc. ii 63.2–3 were aimed at Thoukydides and his like, as men who wished to opt out of empire for moral reasons describable as ἀπραγμοσύνη. The denunciation of this attitude does seem to have a general reference outside the immediate context, but that context must not be left out of account, least of all ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιώς: that is, present fear of the kind indicated at ii 59.1 might induce some to consider even this (καὶ τόδε), resigning the empire. Since they could cover their fear with a cloak of virtue, Perikles goes on to consider that virtue and its unsuitability in a ruling city; but nothing that he has here been given to say encourages us to ascribe to any group or individual a settled policy of abandoning the empire when not under duress. For some critics Aristophanes is a conservative hostile to the empire as well as to Kleon: but the view of his early *Babylonians* as a tract against Athenian oppression of the allies was demolished long ago by G. Norwood in *CP* xxv (1930) 1–10, and such texts as *Wasps* 706–11 show him taking the exploitation of the empire very much in his stride. Ps. Xen. 1.14 claims that the Athenian upper classes try to save men of their own class in the allied cities, and one can imagine cases in the Athenian lawcourts for which this would be true, but that does not take us very far. Against that

¹⁰ On Wade-Gery's unfortunate notion that there was a demobilisation problem, Frost (391–2) said all that is needed. Frost himself (390), after discussing possible sources from the late fourth century, refers to Plutarch's own experience of urban unemployment in Greece, and this could certainly be a factor; but the concept is so central to 12.4–6 that it must have been present also in the source.

¹¹ See also Burford in *Econ. Hist. Rev.* 2 xiii (1960–1) 1–18. The fullest data on transport are from work at

Eleusis in the fourth century, on which see Glotz, *REG* xxxvi (1923) 26–45, whose tabulation of the items in *IG* ii² 1673 is reproduced by Burford on p. 14. See also her account of transport in *The Greek Temple Builders at Epidauros*, 184–91, from which it clearly emerges that there can be no question of mass employment in this area.

¹² Meiggs (*Ath. Emp.* 140) called attention to the speeches of Perikles and others which Cicero believed to be genuine, but Quintilian and Plutarch treat as certainly spurious.

we may set Thuc. viii 48.6, where Phrynichos is made to speak in very strong terms of maltreatment of the cities by the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* of Athens, against whom the Athenian *demos* is the cities' refuge.¹³ At viii 91.3 Thucydides runs through the priorities of the extremists among the Four Hundred in their attempts to make peace with Sparta: their first preference was to keep the empire with their oligarchic government, though to save the oligarchy and their skins they would have settled for less favourable terms. The group around Theramenes in fact carried on the war and tried to recover what had been lost from the empire. There was not much comfort for the allies on the right wing of Athenian politics.

Shades of opinion differed, and degrees of brutality, but the empire was the possession of all Athenians, in large part the creation of Kimon, its tribute a substantial saving to the pockets of the rich. These chapters of Plutarch seem to me false to the feeling of mid-century Athens about the empire, as they are also mistaken about the problems that then faced the city and absurd in much of their detail; they are no good guide to the character or policy of Thucydides. For his position and standing we turn to Plato, *Meno* 94d, where it is said that he had very many friends among the Athenians and the allies, belonged to a great house, and had great influence in the city and among the other Greeks: that is a credible picture painted by a near-contemporary of an Athenian political leader of the older school.¹⁴ The standing of his father Melesias in the world of Pindar is another pointer, and Wade-Gery's treatment of this topic gives his article a value independent of the controversy over his particular political conclusions.

None of this defines a policy, or indicates that Thucydides' attitude to the empire differed from Kimon's. Shaky as the direct evidence is, the stories that we have require as a minimum substratum of fact that he had some temporary success in a struggle with Perikles, and that his ostracism paved the way for Perikles' supremacy. To account for this success, no more is needed than to readmit those events of Athens' external history which Plutarch's source excluded. We may suppose that Thucydides inherited some advantage from the glamour of his kinsman Kimon, more particularly the votes of those patriotic Athenians to whom peace with Persia was abhorrent: the Peace of Kallias cannot have been universally popular. More devastatingly, the loss of Boiotia and Megara, and the surrenders which were superficially the outstanding feature of the Thirty Years' Peace, were major setbacks which called in question the policies pursued by Athens since the death of Kimon. That gave Thucydides an opportunity, which he evidently failed to exploit effectively. Probably the trouble was just that he had no positive policy for Athens: Perikles at least stood for internal changes which appealed to the electorate, whereas Thucydides had nothing to offer but opposition, or the restoration of an older system which could no longer be resuscitated.

2. THOURIOI AND PANHELLENISM

It has long been recognised that *Vit. Anon. Thuc.* 6–7 contains items which cannot belong to the historian but might be assigned to the son of Melesias: but since Wade-Gery's attempt to mobilise these data the whole text has been too easily brushed aside.¹⁵ The main objection is to the confusion of the writer's mind, which is undeniable, but the foolish use he made of his material does nothing to diminish the probability that he was working from an account of Thucydides fuller than any that has come down to us. Further, though it appears that his memory was kept green in the time of Plato and Aristotle, Thucydides was not the kind of hero around whom later fiction would be likely to accumulate; an ancient account of him is probably early, liable to contemporary bias but not to later distortion.

Since my concern is with Thourioi, I leave the general question as Wade-Gery set it out

¹³ The considerable difficulties of this passage will be discussed in *HCT ad loc.*: I still find it hard to understand the mechanism of the upper-class exploitation of the empire, but there is no doubt that the words given to Phrynichos imply that it took place. The importance of this unique passage is rightly stressed by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix in *Hist.* iii (1954) 37–8.

¹⁴ See W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of fifth-century Athens* (1971), *passim*.

¹⁵ See Gomme 386 n. 2; Ehrenberg 161; Frost 385 n. 2. S. Accame, *Riv. Fil.* xxxiii (1955) 164–74, leaves the tangle rather worse than it was; N. K. Rutter, *Hist.* xxii (1973) 155–76, is gently sceptical of received ideas about Thourioi, including the Perikleian connection of Xenokritos and even of Lampon.

(261–2), with one qualification. The first event in this story is Thoukydides' defence of Pylilampes (for whom see now J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 329–30) on a charge of murder. The writer then presents his election to the generalship and his political dominance as the result of this, *ὄθεν καὶ στρατηγόν, κτλ.*: and this led Wade-Gery to date the trial tentatively to c. 445. But the Anonymus also says that this was the first exhibition of Thoukydides' oratorical skill, and if he was born c. 500 (Davies 231) and Pylilampes c. 480, this trial ought to be dated earlier, in which case *ὄθεν* covers some telescoping of matter which did not so much interest the writer. I have argued above that we need not shrink from allowing Thoukydides to hold military office, and it is unlikely that his first generalship came late in his career, at the time of his main struggle with Perikles when he would be around 55.

His downfall begins with another trial. Thoukydides went to Sybaris, for reasons not stated, and on his return he was successfully prosecuted by Xenokritos on a charge *συγχύσεως δικαστηρίου*; and later he was ostracised.¹⁶ Xenokritos is known from Diod. xii 10.3 (cf. Phot. etc. s.v. *θουριομάνταις*) as the colleague of the better-known Lampon in the foundation of Thourioi, and it therefore looks as if there was some connection between the journey to Sybaris and the trial; but we do not know enough detail of the Sybaris story to see clearly what was happening. For the outline, we have the sequence set out most recently by Wade-Gery and Ehrenberg, and by C. M. Kraay in *NC* 6. xviii (1958) 24–32, the stages of which are clearly marked in the coinage: an appeal by the exiled Sybarites for help in refounding their city, to which Athens responded (Kraay's Sybaris IV); a quarrel between the new settlers and the old Sybarites, ending in the expulsion of the latter; and the second Athenian expedition which founded Thourioi on a new site.¹⁷ The fullest account, that of Diodoros (xii 10–11), has amalgamated the two Athenian expeditions in such a way that no simple dissection will separate them; and the chronology is a nightmare of small-scale uncertainties.

Diodoros' chronographic source, like others of his tribe, was addicted to foundation-dates, and in view of Diodoros' practice elsewhere it is a reasonable guess that he put his whole mixed story under 446/5 because his source gave that date for Sybaris IV: this would not fit well with either of the dates we have for Thourioi (below), but it coheres well enough with Diodoros' data about the earlier independent refoundation Sybaris III, which he dates to 453/2 (xi 90.3–4) and says that it lasted five years (xii 10.2, unnecessarily bracketed by Vogel). xii 22.1 puts under 445/4 the foundation of Sybaris on the Traeis by the men expelled from Sybaris IV. If that is right, events moved quickly (there is no reason why they should not have), and Sybaris IV should be placed early in 446/5; we may accept the suggestion in *ATL* (iii 305 with n. 19) that 'the project was conceived before the crisis of 446,' i.e. early in 446 when the position of Perikles had not yet been seriously shaken. It should have been possible for the planned expedition to sail in the latter part of the summer, after the crisis had been settled by the agreement between Perikles and Pleistoanax, and that would leave the winter and probably the whole calendar year 445 available for the development of the quarrel within Sybaris IV.

Our two dates for Thourioi depend on the supposed migration of Lysias to Thourioi in boyhood (on which see K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the 'Corpus Lysiacum'* 38–43): [Plut.] 835d gives an archon, Praxiteles 444/3, while Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 1 (8R) gives the twelfth year before the Peloponnesian War, which should mean 443/2. Calculation of an interval offers higher chances of error than the naming of an archon, so we might marginally prefer 444/3, but there can be no certainty.¹⁸ For Thoukydides' ostracism we have only the imprecise statement of Plut. *Per.* 16.3,

¹⁶ The same sequence, defeat in court followed by ostracism, is found in schol. Ar. *Vesp.* 947, where the context is confused but the great orator who thus suffered must be our Thoukydides. Ehrenberg (160) found the sequence incredible, but did not say why: possibly he overlooked the fact that ostracism took place at a fixed time of year, and might not have been available at the time of the trial.

¹⁷ F. Rainey, *AJA* lxxiii (1969) 272, remarks that 'all the archaeological evidence points to the conclusion that Thurii was built over the southern section of the city of Sybaris'. The oracle about the change of site (Diod. xii 10.5–6; Parke and Wormell no. 131) may well be spur-

ious, but the story was established by the time of Diodoros' source, which (with Rutter) I take to be probably in this case Ephoros rather than Timaios.

¹⁸ Diod. xii 23.2 puts under 444/3 a sporadic war between Thourioi and Taras, of which he says there was no action worth reporting. His chronographic source appears to have taken note of the outbreak and end of some wars, with a distinguishable formula for the name and duration of the war (e.g. xiv 86.6); but nothing of this sort appears here, and I take this notice to be a piece of Thourian history from his narrative source, put in to fill a gap.

that after it Perikles had 'not less than fifteen years' of continuous power. Wade-Gery (240) proposed to reckon back from his death to spring 443, and though part of his argument is vulnerable it is a cogent point that to count fifteen years back from the deposition in 430 would put the ostracism too early. But Plutarch's form of words does not allow us to fix on 443 to the exclusion of spring 444. It is thus not possible to determine whether the actual departure of the expedition came before or after the ostracism, but we can fairly assume that the plan was under discussion before Thoukydides left Athens.

Wade-Gery's theory, that an originally Perikleian venture had been given a panhellenic turn by Thoukydides in his brief period of power, was abandoned in *ATL* (iii 305 n. 20); and if the argument of the first part of this paper is correct, panhellenism in the sense of 'equality of all Greek states, the renouncement of Athenian domination' (Wade-Gery 256) was not the policy of any political group at Athens. The athletic world of Pindar and Melesias was 'international' in the sense that its members were drawn from many cities and in some respects felt more sympathy with one another than with the lower orders of their own cities, but this was not reflected in the conduct of inter-city politics or war.¹⁹ It seems an excess of scepticism to doubt that Thoukydides went to Sybaris (Ehrenberg 160-1)—the statement of the Anonymus is lamentably incomplete, but the voyage and the link with Xenokritos do not appear likely stuff for fiction—and his object was presumably to further the success of the state's undertaking.²⁰ If I had to make a guess, it would be that he went in the course of 445 to try to patch up the quarrel that ended in the expulsion of the original Sybarites, and that failure in this left him vulnerable to attack by Xenokritos.

As regards the 'panhellenism' of Thourioi, the main question is about Diodoros' list of its ten tribes at xii 11.3. His artificial grouping must be disregarded. Arkas, Achaia and Eleia do, as he claims, take their names from the Peloponnese, but for his next triad ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὁμοειθῶν is a meaningless description: the Peloponnesian three were not to Greek thinking closely related, while Boiotia, Amphiktyonis and Doris were not kin to one another and cannot be paired racially with members of the first triad.²¹ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν is a curious way to describe the block from Athens and her empire, Ias, Athenais, Eubois and Nesiotis, where all should be Ionians except perhaps a few from the islands. This is the large homogeneous group that might have been expected to impose a unitary character on an otherwise mongrel colony, and Athenais was a reminder of Athenian leadership even if it does not imply that literally one-tenth of the citizens were Athenian by origin; later, when the affiliation of the colony was in question (Diod. xii 35.1-3), the Athenians claimed that they had sent the largest number of colonists (*sc.* from any one city). Their claim was not respected, and with the adoption of Apollo as 'founder' the colony lost its formal connection with Athens, but that does not affect the validity of inference from the names originally given to the tribes.

For the remaining six, Ehrenberg (159) was right to suspect an anti-Spartan tinge. It is surely important (his n. 36) that before the end of 446 Athens must have had on her hands a substantial number of her former supporters in Boiotia, now exiles or refugees. The principle could be extended. There should be similar refugees from Phokis, Lokris and perhaps elsewhere in Central Greece, and in view of Athens' earlier treaty with the Amphiktions (Meritt, *AJP* lxi [1948] 312; *SEG* x 18) a tribe named Amphiktyonis is an appropriate place for them. Ehrenberg (*ibid.*) noted that Achaia had joined Athens some years before it was surrendered under the Thirty Years' Peace, so there might be refugees from there: here we have also to remember the old connection between Achaia and Sybaris, though that might have been weakened by the expulsion of the old colonists from Sybaris IV. For Arkas no special explanation is needed in view of the excess population which sent out so many mercenaries, but if there is reason to posit elements hostile to

¹⁹ Cf. Agesilaos' apology to Pharnabazos for plundering the territory of a former friend and ally (Xen. *Hell.* iv 1.34). The story of Kimon's attempt to fight for Athens at Tanagra, true or false in fact, is right in feeling; Alkibiades' peculiar form of patriotism (Thuc. vi 92.2-4) was exceptional and suspect.

²⁰ Ehrenberg (161) was certain that, if Thoukydides did make such a voyage, it was 'with the intention of

causing trouble and of interfering with Pericles' plans'. This goes well beyond what Wade-Gery proposed, and seems to me misconceived.

²¹ Modern writers sometimes use the term 'Dorian' very loosely; e.g. Rutter (n. 15) appears to take six out of the ten tribes as Dorian (166). In Classical Greek it is an exact term, and so far as the names here go, only Doris qualifies.

Sparta in other tribes, we may remember (Ehrenberg, *ibid.*) the anti-Spartan feeling that from time to time surfaces in Arkadia. Elis is a less obvious source for colonists;²² but though Elis emerges as an ally of Corinth and Sparta in 435 (Thuc. i 27.2, ii 9.3), the previous record certainly does not ensure that colonists affiliated with Elis in 443 would be pro-Spartan. Doris remains ambiguous. The label implies some colonists from some Dorian area, but there is nothing to show whether this was the Dorian sector of the Peloponnese²³ or Rhodes and S.W. Asia Minor. The two conspicuous Dorians at Thourioi in the fifth century are no help, since both went there as exiles: Kleandridas the Spartan, who was believed to have been bribed by Perikles in 446 and of whom no anti-Athenian action is recorded from the time when he led the military forces of Thourioi, and Dorieus the Rhodian who was anti-Athenian enough (Thuc. viii 35.1, etc.), but the cause of his exile is less clearly indicated (Paus. vi 7.4) and the chronology of his life (*cf.* Gomme, *HCT* ii, on Thuc. iii 8.1) suggests that his exile should be dated relatively late, after the ties between Athens and Thourioi were loosened. The list of tribes cannot be used to show that Athenian interests were subordinated to those of a wider panhellenism.

There remains the proclamation to the cities of the Peloponnese (Diod. xii 10.4). The context does not clearly date it. 10.4 begins from Athens' acceptance of the original Sybarite invitation, so the ten ships then sent should belong to the first expedition; but they are led by Lampon and Xenokritos, certainly leaders of the second venture.²⁴ Then follows the proclamation, in terms which do not make it clear which colony the Peloponnesians are invited to join; and then in 10.5–6 the oracle and the change of site to Thourioi. This is pretty indeterminate, but it seems unlikely that heralds were sent to the Peloponnese late on in 446, whereas if this belongs to *c.* 443 we can provide a reason why the heralds were sent only to the Peloponnese, *viz.* enough colonists from Central Greece and the empire were available or already collected. In the event the response was from Arkadia, Achaia and Elis, which provided colonists enough to give names to three of the tribes; we do not know what the response from the Dorian Peloponnese may have been.

I would conclude then that both phases of the attempt to found this colony in the west were probably the work of Perikles rather than of the opposition; and that no clear objective can be discerned other than to increase the power and glory of Athens. But it may well be doubted if Sybaris and Thourioi were the major preoccupations of Athens in these eventful years.

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²² Ehrenberg (158 n. 33) takes Elis as 'a sort of one-state Olympic Amphictyony', with Olympia balancing the Delphi to be read out of the tribe-name Amphiktyonis. The 'Olympic Amphictyony' is surely a mirage, though it is true that Elis had in the fifth century completed her reduction of several minor tribes of the W. Peloponnese (Hdt. iv 148.4), who might have contributed members to a tribe Eleia.

²³ This would then be the tribe for colonists from Corinth or Argos; and even Sparta has been contemplated

(Ehrenberg 159). The notion that a potential share in this one tribe constituted any sort of appeasement of Corinth (Wade-Gery 256, citing O'Neill's *Ancient Corinth* 196) can hardly stand.

²⁴ It is just possible that these two also led the first expedition for Sybaris IV and returned to Athens soon after (Lampon at least returned from Thourioi to resume his career in Athens); but it is more likely that Diodoros has conflated the two expeditions.